Does corruption increase antidumping investigations?

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dc.contributor.authorAvşar, Veysel
dc.contributor.authorHabiyaremye, Alexis
dc.contributor.authorUnal, Umut
dc.date.accessioned2025-10-24T18:06:53Z
dc.date.available2025-10-24T18:06:53Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.departmentMalatya Turgut Özal Üniversitesi
dc.description.abstractThis paper represents the first attempt to examine the influence that corruption exerts on the worldwide use of antidumping (AD) claims as a means to seek trade protection. Since the inception of the World Trade Organization and the concomitant dramatic fall in tariffs, AD duties have become one of the few permissible measures to provide temporary protection to foreign competition. Increased lobbying pressure in this area has gone hand in hand with the explosion of number of AD filings. We hypothesized that corruption gives the import competing sector the opportunity to more effectively lobby for trade protection and this can be expected to result in more attempts to use AD filings. Using cross-country data on AD investigations, we provide support to this hypothesis. © 2016 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
dc.identifier.endpage665
dc.identifier.issn2146-4138
dc.identifier.issue2
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84979798514
dc.identifier.scopusqualityN/A
dc.identifier.startpage660
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12899/3267
dc.identifier.volume6
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopus
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherEconjournals ijeep@econjournals.com
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Journal of Economics and Financial Issues
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.snmzScopus_20251023
dc.subjectAntidumping
dc.subjectCorruption
dc.subjectInstitutions
dc.subjectTrade policy
dc.titleDoes corruption increase antidumping investigations?
dc.typeArticle

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