Does corruption increase antidumping investigations?
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2016
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Econjournals ijeep@econjournals.com
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
This paper represents the first attempt to examine the influence that corruption exerts on the worldwide use of antidumping (AD) claims as a means to seek trade protection. Since the inception of the World Trade Organization and the concomitant dramatic fall in tariffs, AD duties have become one of the few permissible measures to provide temporary protection to foreign competition. Increased lobbying pressure in this area has gone hand in hand with the explosion of number of AD filings. We hypothesized that corruption gives the import competing sector the opportunity to more effectively lobby for trade protection and this can be expected to result in more attempts to use AD filings. Using cross-country data on AD investigations, we provide support to this hypothesis. © 2016 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Antidumping, Corruption, Institutions, Trade policy
Kaynak
International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues
WoS Q Değeri
Scopus Q Değeri
N/A
Cilt
6
Sayı
2
