Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time

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dc.authoridRusinowska, Agnieszka/0000-0003-3803-9907;
dc.contributor.authorRusinowska, Agnieszka
dc.contributor.authorOzkardas, Ahmet
dc.date.accessioned2025-10-24T18:10:22Z
dc.date.available2025-10-24T18:10:22Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.departmentMalatya Turgut Özal Üniversitesi
dc.description.abstractWe consider a union-firm wage bargaining in which the union must choose between strike and holdout in case of disagreement, and preferences of the union and the firm are expressed by sequences of discount rates varying in time. We show that there may exist inefficient subgame perfect equilibria in the model under which the union engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement. For an inefficient equilibrium to exist, the status quo wage must be sufficiently low and the amounts that the firm offers for itself in the subgame perfect equilibrium under the exogenous always strike decision in every odd period before reaching an agreement must be sufficiently low.
dc.identifier.endpage+
dc.identifier.issn1545-2921
dc.identifier.issue3
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85109924366
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2
dc.identifier.startpage1744
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12899/4142
dc.identifier.volume35
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000365945000039
dc.identifier.wosqualityN/A
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Science
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopus
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherEconomics Bulletin
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics Bulletin
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.snmzKA_20251023
dc.subjectInformed Agents; Perfect Equilibrium; Striking; Model
dc.titleInefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time
dc.typeArticle

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