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    Holdout Threats During Wage Bargaining
    (Springer Int Publishing Ag, 2016) Ozkardas, Ahmet; Rusinowska, Agnieszka
    We investigate a wage bargaining between a union and a firm where the parties' preferences are expressed by varying discount rates and the threat of the union is to be on go-slow instead of striking. First, we describe the attitude of the union as hostile or altruistic where a hostile union is on go-slow in every disagreement period and an altruistic union never threatens the firm and holds out in every disagreement period. Then we derive subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining when the union's attitude is determined exogenously. Furthermore, we determine necessary conditions for the equilibrium extreme payoffs of both parties independently of the union's attitude and calculate the extreme payoffs for a particular case when the firm is at least as patient as the union.
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    Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time
    (Economics Bulletin, 2015) Rusinowska, Agnieszka; Ozkardas, Ahmet
    We consider a union-firm wage bargaining in which the union must choose between strike and holdout in case of disagreement, and preferences of the union and the firm are expressed by sequences of discount rates varying in time. We show that there may exist inefficient subgame perfect equilibria in the model under which the union engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement. For an inefficient equilibrium to exist, the status quo wage must be sufficiently low and the amounts that the firm offers for itself in the subgame perfect equilibrium under the exogenous always strike decision in every odd period before reaching an agreement must be sufficiently low.
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    WAGE BARGAINING WITH DISCOUNT RATES VARYING IN TIME UNDER DIFFERENT STRIKE DECISIONS
    (Edp Sciences S A, 2014) Ozkardas, Ahmet; Rusinowska, Agnieszka
    We present a non-cooperative union-firm wage bargaining model in which the union must choose between strike and holdout if a proposed wage contract is rejected. The innovative element that our model brings to the existing literature on wage bargaining concerns the parties' preferences which are not expressed by constant discount rates, but by sequences of discount factors varying in time. First, we determine subgame perfect equilibria if the strike decision of the union is exogenous. We analyze the case when the union is committed to strike in each disagreement period, the case when the union is committed to strike only when its own offer is rejected, and the case of the never strike exogenous decision. A comparison of the results is provided, among the cases of the exogenous strike decisions. Next, we consider the general model with no assumption on the commitment to strike. We find subgame perfect equilibria in which the strategies supporting the equilibria in the exogenous cases are combined with the minimum-wage strategies, provided that the firm is not less patient than the union. If the firm is more impatient than the union, then the firm is better off by playing the no-concession strategy. We find a subgame perfect equilibrium for this case.